There are two weeks left until 9th of February, the date for the pivotal parliamentary elections in Kosovo. Political landscape is more or less established in three poles:

• Incumbent Vetevendosje, populist movement led its perennial leader and current prime minister Albin Kurti. VV won a landslide election in 2021 and has been the only party in history of Kosovo, since the days of communism, which has controlled (without a coalition partner) both the government, the parliament and the presidency, for much of the mandate.

• Democratic Party of Kosovo, which was initially established by the founding members of Kosovo Liberation Army, but which has become an ‘establishment’ party governing Kosovo during the historic period of Declaration of Independence and establishment of state institutions and international recognition of Kosovo. It’s now a very active member of ALDE, the European center-right party group. PDK’s candidate for PM is Bedri Hamza, an experienced and unblemished former finance minister and c-bank governor.

• Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) is the oldest political party in Kosovo, established in 1990 and identified with Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovo’s leader of peaceful resistance. LDK’s nominee is the youngish Lumir Abdixhiku, who has joined LDK fairly recently, on the back of a almost total electoral annihilation of LDK in 2021. Abdixhiku has an experience in NGO sector, support from the private sector - and some experience as a Minister of Transport in the previous Kurti-led government.

• There’s also AAK of the former maverick PM Ramush Haradinaj (with a more regional base in Dukagjini region) which is not to be discounted, as it hopes to become a kingmaker in the future coalition making. A new Islamist conservative coalition “Familja” consisting of VV MPs who left Kurti in recent months over issues such as same-sex marriage and IVF rights for single mothers is also hoping for a similar role - if they manage to pass the 5% threshold.

My personal opinion is known and public, and not much different from some sort of prevailing consensus: VV is expected to win the plurality of votes, but not a governing majority with a potential spread from 30% to 40% of overall vote (polls are all over the place). PDK and LDK have different voters and can’t canibalize each other so much but are still fighting for a strong second place finish. Kurti has all but burned bridges for future coalition making - thus such a government coalition-making potential rests with the opposition, following models in Spain, Poland, to some extend even France, where some parties won most votes but fell short of a governing majority.

But what can go wrong? Let’s dwell a bit in some hypothetical scenarios…

Constitutional crisis and a blockade

If Kurti wins majority of seats, the sequence is as follows: results get certified (potentially by March), party with the most seats nominates the Speaker of the Parliament and thus the new Parliament is constituted; President gives the mandate to the biggest party to form the government. They have 30 days to do so and upon/if failure (by mid to end of April), President has the right to give the mandate to an alternative PM candidate, who has 30 days to create a parliamentary majority (until mid-May). If second option also fails, the country is headed towards new, snap elections.

There may be more delays along the way, especially if Kurti senses he doesn’t have a majority: there can be delays in the appointment of the Speaker, or attempts to involve the Constitutional Court to buy time.

Embittered egos

There may be bruised egos in parts of opposition and disagreements over who should lead the government, so there are plenty of chances for a prolonged post-election period. PDK has formally declared that whoever has more votes from the opposition should lead the government. LDK has been adamant that it will only enter any government if it holds the premier position. AAK has publicly declared it wants the position of President. This leaves little space for manoeuvring, if parties remain entrenched in these positions. President Osmani may also decide to nominate a candidate of her own liking for the second attempt, disregarding the actual electoral votes. So the crisis may even spill into the summer months, leaving Kosovo without a government. Local elections are also looming in 2025, planned for October, which may further complicate negotiations.

The forthcoming election of the new President of the Republic

Kosovo must elect a new president in the parliament by fall 2025 as the mandate of President Osmani is in its final, ‘lame duck’ period. She has close to zero chances being re-elected after her recent crisis of relations with Kurti and the disappearance of her newly-established party Guxo. Kurti made sure of that, in a particularly harsh moment of political backstabbing, as Osmani left LDK and established ‘Guxo’ to help Kurti win in 2021.

The new president of Kosovo must be voted in the parliament in October/November in three rounds of voting. Last round requires only 51% of Yea’s, but with the necessary 2/3 quorum of sitting MPs, which is another stumbling block if no party or coalition musters such a friendly majority of MP’s taking seats during the vote for the president. If no President can be elected, guess what? The country goes to snap elections in late fall 2025.

The ‘American’ factor

Some folks are predicting the new Trump administration may move to prevent Kurti from becoming a prime minister, but truth be told, Kurti has a historically bad relations with several consecutive American administrations, regardless who is a sitting President in U.S.

American edition of POLITICO few years ago even pointed (only half-jokingly) that “Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti has achieved the impossible in American politics: consensus among Democrats and Republicans. Unfortunately for Kurti (and his country), the point of agreement is that Kosovo’s leader is a stubborn, and at times, reckless politician…”

The history of Kurti’s inexplicably negative relations with the U.S. is old and omnipresent in his political career, spanning three decades:

• 2007: Senior U.S. diplomat heading the pre-independence ‘U.S. Office in Pristina’ Tina Kaidanow (appointed by President George W Bush) already in 2007 has called Kurti’s actions “not only dangerous, but deadly, and he promises to continue to be a destabilizing force in Kosovo.”

• 2010: U.S. Ambassador Chris Dell (appointed by President Obama) has refused to meet Vetevendosje during his mandate stating “VV is not showing that it is committed to democratic processes in Kosovo.”

• 2013: U.S. Ambassador Tracey Jacobson (appointed by President Obama) was “physically attacked during protests by Vetevendosje protesters”, prompting US Embassy to issue a statement: “we deplore the use of violent tactics in obstructing the democratic process.” This unprecedented assault became an international news item, and after Kurti rejected the acussation, Ambassador Jacobsen tweeted a photo of her injury with text “Vetevendosje tried to stop us, but we got in on our second attempt! #bruised.”

• 2017: U.S. Ambassador Greg Delawie (appointed by President Obama) was disturbed by VV using teargas inside the parliament to prevent crucial votes on border demarcation with the friendly Montenegro, stating “once again I have to say that I am disappointed that VV is using violence to hinder democracy.”

• 2020 - the relationship deteriorates even further, with Kurti - in his first PM mandate supported by a coalition with LDK - publicly accused U.S. administration and Donald Trump’s acting national intelligence director Richard Grenell of a coup, bringing downfall of his government. For the first time ever in history of Kosovo, Senators and other influential people within the first Trump administration mention withdrawal of US troops from Kosovo. Senator David Perdue tweets: “If Kosovo is not fully committed to peace, then the US should reconsider its presence there.”

• 2022 - Kurti endorses Biden for presidency, breaking the long-standing tradition of Kosovar politicians keeping bipartisan stance in US politics. The tensions do not abate though, with Senator Chris Murphy (D) publicly calling Kurti to “immediately stop the provocations”; Ambassador Hill in Belgrade stating “I think we have some very fundamental issues with Kurti on whether we can count on him as a partner…” while Ambassador Hovenier in Prishtina also stating “partnership With Kosovo is not what we would hope”.

• 2025: A surprising pivot unfolded during last week when the the VV Speaker of the Parliament stated that both Obama and Biden have put “Kosovo in a disadvantageous position towards Serbia”, a declaration that brought forth a public rebuke from Richard Grenell, now the newly appointed presidential envoy for ‘special missions’, who first questioned Kurti: “They spent the last 4 years complimenting Joe Biden and attending his conventions and parties. Why didn’t they ever complain before?”.

  He followed up with another tweet few days later: “Kurti picked political fights and took unilateral action. He brought Kosovo-U.S. relations to a low point. He was condemned by European leaders, NATO and Joe Biden’s team”.

All this considering, it’s not difficult to predict that the new Trump administration will not have a laissez-faire attitude towards Kurti’s approach in dialogue with Serbia. Some people may indeed call this unfair and appeasement of Serbia, but the fact remains that Kosovo’s government under Kurti have put the relationship with US on a back seat and the buck stops with Kurti. Accusing Obama, Biden, Trump, but also the local opposition, the free media, Albania PM Edi Rama as ‘pro-serb’, does not seem particularly fruitful.

Whether there will be a direct advice from Washington DC to the Kosovar opposition to establish a government coalition after the elections, remains to be seen and will depend on how high will Balkans feature in the US foreign policy in Europe - and the final elections results.